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This paper examines issues related to the WTO’s Agreement on 
Agriculture from India’s point of view. Why India should work 






1. The Setting 
 
According to the Indian Census 2001, the share of cultivators and agriculture 
labourers in the total labour force of India declined from 64.8 per cent in 1991 to 
58.2 per cent in 2001, while the share of agriculture value added in total value 
added of the country dropped from 31.3 per cent to 24.5 per cent. Thus, a 6.8 per 
cent shift in  the output from agriculture to non-agriculture resulted in a shift of 
just about 6.6 per cent labour from farming to non-farming sector. If this were 
the case, then even if the share of agriculture is completely overtaken by the 
other sectors, the problem  of huge income inequality between rural and urban 
will remain daunting. The ratio of income defining the poverty line in urban and 
rural India has increased from 1.29 in 1983-84 to 1.4 in 1999-00. Nevertheless, 
the urban-rural income differential in India  is much smaller than that of 
developed countries (Table 1). In order to bridge these inequalities, the 
developed countries generally tend to resort to heavy subsidies to their 
agricultural sector. The rural-urban divide in India is increasing steadily and  it 
would have to face the same problem as other developed countries are facing at 
present (Table 1). However, India could not afford to employ the same balancing 
strategy as practiced by the developed countries of providing subsidy to the 




Therefore, the solution to reduce the rural-urban divide in India lies in 
employment-generating large-scale industrialization and expansion of 
agriculture processing and exports, so that each percentage point shift in the 
share of agriculture value added to other sectors leads to at least two percentages 
points shift in the labour force from farm sector to non-farm sector. Maintaining 
this target itself will inherently lead to a comparable growth in per capita income 
of the farm sector.  
 
Table 1: Urban-Rural Divide and the Quantum of Subsidy 
  Ratio of per capita urban income  
 to per capita rural income  
Subsidy as percentage of  
agriculture value added  
  1980  1990  2001  1986-88  2002 
India  6  7  9  6  7 
Canada  7  11  12  48  31 
United States  13  17  19  38  26 
Japan  8  12  20  71  84 
European Monetary Union 8  10  13  77  65 
High income OECD  9  11  15  67  54 
 
Source: (Basic data WDI 2005, Agriculture Statistics 2005, Acharya (2001)): Per 
capita rural income = agriculture value added (current US$) to rural population; 
Per capita urban income = (total GDP at current US$ less agriculture value 
added (current US$) to urban population (basic data WDI 2005); Indian 
agriculture Subsidy 1986-88 from Acharya (2001); Other data on Subsidy from 
OECD (2004) cited in GOI (2005). 
 
 
However, the food price inflation in India has been traditionally much higher 
than those in developed countries such as the United States, Japan or Canada 
making it harder to export agricultural processed products. After remaining at an 
average annual rate of 9 per cent during 1981-90 and almost 11 per cent during 
1991-98, the food price inflation has come down to the level of these countries 
only recently (Figure 1). The general inflation in India during 1998-2003 has 
been about 4.5 per cent and a similar trend continued during the later periods of 
2004-2006. Clearly, if imports were going to reduce the food prices further, it 
would not be increasing the welfare of farmers, unless substantial gains are made 
























Source (basic data): World Development Indicators 2005, the World Bank 
 
However, with agriculture subsidies and export promotions, developed countries 
have dominated the world agriculture market historically. More than 67 per cent 
of world food exports during 2001-03 originated from the high-income countries 
(Table 2), while countries such as India where more than  65 per cent people 
survive on agriculture, contributed only 1.1 per cent of food exports.   
 
Table 2: Food Exports: Share (%) in World Food Exports 
  1971-80 1981-90 1991-00 2001-03 
China      2.5  3.1 
India  1.1  0.9  1.0  1.1 
East Asia & Pacific      7.9  9.0 
European Monetary Union    31.5  35.7  35.8 
High income  60.6  64.8  69.0  67.4 
Latin America & Caribbean  11.6  10.2  10.4  12.2 
 
Source (Basic data): World Development Indicators 2005, the World Bank. 
 
 
Clearly, world food exports situation indicates that the Agreements on 
Agriculture (A-o-A) negotiations are more important for developed countries 
too. Given the high stakes and conflicts in interests, the A-o-A negotiations are 



















































































































































1, the EU and the United States, are all wide apart. United States is 
trying to preserve subsidy on cotton while the European Union, is trying to 
preserve domestic support to food products. The least developed countries are 
still on the periphery. 
 
It is very  clear that expecting developed countries to maintain the rural-urban 
divide of the extent appearing in Table 1 is self-defeating. However, the often 
stated reasons to provide subsidy does not include these aspects. The commonly 
discussed objectives include (1) to make sure that enough food is produced to 
meet the country’s needs; (2) to shield farmers from the effects of the natural 
calamities and swings in world prices and (3) to preserve rural society. If this 
was so simple then why should developed countries work hard to produce 
surplus food and take pains to export even in the absence of revealed 
comparative advantage? Food security does not require producing surpluses, 
neither it requires that surpluses be diverted to meet aid obligation for the least 
developed countries. On the other hand, transfer of technology could make the 
least developed countries more self-sufficient. Often a prolonged food aid 
program could render a country net importer of food due to the dependency 
created by circumstances. With such dependency, the governments cannot afford 
to raise tariff on food imports in order to encourage domestic production. Once 
such a vicious circle is created it becomes difficult to come out of it.  EU gives 
huge amount of aid to least developed countries in the form of food and other 
subsidised products.  It is argued that the US grain imports and cheap EU 
exports of subsidized beef into Africa had destroyed the pastoral economy 
including small-scale cattle growers in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
However, the problem of developing countries like India gets escalated, when it 
is asked to give agriculture market access to the developing countries by 
reducing tariff, particularly in a situation where India cannot afford to adopt 
alternative schemes like detached income, an option already existing in the 
developed world. India is a net exporter in the agriculture sector and therefore, it 
                                                                   
1 A group formed in 1986 at Cairns, Australia. The group  includes major food exporters from both 
developed and developing countries: Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Fiji, Guatemala, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Paraguay, the Philippines, Thailand, South 
Africa, and Uruguay   
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is likely to be benefited by provisions of Agreement on Agriculture (A-o-A). 
However, it is important to note that the gains from agriculture exports may not 
outsmart the losses incurred on account of compromising the market access in 
industry and services. For India to take advantage of the reduction in tariff in 
industrial sector and conceding access to services, requires it to develop 
comparative advantage in these areas quickly. The development agenda of the 
WTO is a constructive tool in this regard and the directions of future 
negotiations are critical for its success. 
  
With respect to Swiss formula concerning tariff reduction, the current proposals 
would translate in a reduction of the EU's average bound rates to 2.3 per cent 
and that of the US to 2.1 per cent (Lamy 2006). Considering the fact that these 
two Members absorb about 28 per cent of India’s manufactured export products, 
such reductions could substantially affect India's total exports in a market where 
its goods ‘already suffer hugely from the discrimination resulting from trade 
preferences to most of its competitors in the EU and North American markets’ 
(Panagariya, 2004). Therefore, at the outset, it is believed that India has most to 
gain from a successful completion of the Doha round.  
 
It is in this context, this paper examines issues related to India’s agriculture 
trade, policies, and its potential strategies for negotiations with respect to agenda 
concerning agriculture.  Rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 
presents an overview of the extent of agriculture trade in the World and in India. 
Agriculture and the World Trade Organization with particular emphasis on the 
Agreements on Agriculture (A-o-A) and India’s standing on A-o-A are discussed 
in section 3. We present the readiness of India for international integration with 
respect to its current agriculture policy regime in section 4. Overall conclusions 
of this paper are drawn in Section 5.  
 
2. Trade in agriculture thus far: World and India 
Whether the WTO regime has been successful in accelerating growth in trade in 
general and agriculture trade in particular, remains a matter of debate and so are 
the possible welfare gains and likely beneficiaries of proposed trade 
liberalization in agriculture sector. The average import duty on international   
 
7 
goods in developed countries was around 40 per cent during 1948, which has 
been brought down to 6.4 per cent by 1990 as a result of efforts by GATT. This 
is reflected in high growth in world trade during 1960s and 1970s (Table 3 and 
Figure 2). However, the average growth of global agriculture exports during 
1980s and 1990s has been just around 3.3 per cent while total exports have 
grown by more than six per cent (Table 3).  
It is only during 2003 that agriculture exports recorded a double digit growth of 
about 16 per cent pulling up the average for 2001-03 to seven per cent. As a 
result of the prolonged sluggishness in agriculture exports growth, their share in 
total exports has reduced to almost 9.8 per cent during 2001-03 (average) as 
compared to almost 20 per cent during early 1970s. Such trends are observed 
across all segments  of countries with respect to food exports and food imports 
(Table 4). Only the sub-Sahara Africa has recorded improvement in agriculture 
exports and imports growth. 
Table 3: Average growth in global exports (annual per cent)  
  Total   Agricultural products  Mining products  Manufactures 
1961-70  7.8            4.8  10.1  10.8 
1971-80  21.6          17.2  30.6  19.4 
1981-90  5.7            3.6  -0.7  8.7 
1991-00  6.5            3.1  6.9  7.0 
2001-03  5.4            7.2  4.2  5.3 
Source (basic data): WTO (2005): World Trade Statistics  
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Source (basic data): WTO world trade statistics 
 
 
Table 4: Food exports (% of merchandise exports) and Food imports (% of 
merchandise imports) 





















Food exports (% of 
merchandise exports)  
                   
China      8.4   4.9  3.6    14.2 8.6   4.9  
India  23.0 16.5 7.7   5.1  5.8  33.8  31.5 22.2 16.5 12.2 
European Monetary Union  19.3 15.0 12.0  10.4 8.8  16.6  13.2 11.6 10.2 8.9  
High income  19.1 13.5 9.9   8.4  7.4  15.9  12.5 10.0 8.1   7.1  
Latin America & Caribbean  9.9   11.2 11.9  8.8  7.9  46.2  38.7 25.2 20.9 18.3 
Low income  20.3 17.3 12.9  11.6 9.6  38.1  30.8 23.6 19.9 21.0 
Middle income    12.2 10.9  8.6  8.0      18.9 13.1 9.7  
Sub-Saharan Africa    10.8 12.2  13.0 14.3     
27.2 
16.4 18.2 19.8 
World  18.4 13.4 10.1  8.5  7.5  19.4  15.6 12.0 9.3   7.9  




India’s Comparative Advantage in Agriculture and trade related performance 
At present, India is a net food exporter. In fact, its share of exports in world 
exports is greater for agriculture than it is for manufactured products, the total 
export share b eing less than one per cent. India’s agricultural exports have 
continuously grown since 1999 (Figure 3). Therefore, India is likely to gain if 
the EU, the US, Japan and other major agriculture subsidisers significantly 
reduce their farm subsidies.  The same can be said of the elimination of export 
subsidies on cotton by 2006. It is also in India’s interests that other countries 
decrease tariffs to its farm exports on products such as cotton, basmati rice, fish 
or meat. India will have to tap other markets also in order to keep pace with its 
export growth in manufacturing. The share of Indian exports in agriculture is 
sliding down as compared to manufacturing (Figure 4). These labour-intensive 
exports are expected to grow much faster and potential areas include textiles and 
food processing translating into benefits across a large group of farmers and 
contributing to stabilising their incomes.  India has demonstrated revealed 
comparative advantage (RCA) in almost all the products it exports, and even in   
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those products it imports (Table 5). Therefore, India enjoys a large range of 
products where it could successfully enhance its capacity to export.  
India is the third largest producer of cotton in the world and second-largest 
producer of cotton yarns and textiles.  On January 1, 2005, developed countries 
removed import quotas on textile products previously sanctioned by the 1974 
Multi-fibre Arrangement (MFA). This change provides a major opportunity for 
India to expand production and exports of textiles and apparel  to developed 
country markets. India, like other countries such as China have been preparing 
for this occasion through relaxation in investment restrictions for modernisation 
of plants and manufacturing processes. 
 
 
















Source (basic data): Monthly Statistics of Foreign Trade, Government of India (various years) 
 
However, India has been lagging to its key competitor, China in liberalising the 
economy. With demonstrated comparative advantage in production of both raw 
cotton and textiles, it is expected that India will continue to adopt policies 
favourable for cotton and textiles exports. 
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2  MEAT AND EDIBLE MEAT OFFAL.     3  0  0.8 
3  FISH AND CRUSTACEANS, MOLLUSCS AND OTHER 
AQUATIC INVERTABRATES. 
   11  0  3.2 
4  DAIRY PRODUCE; BIRDS' EGGS; NATURAL HONEY; 
EDIBLE PROD. OF ANIMAL ORIGIN, NOT ELSEWHERE 
SPEC. OR INCLUDED. 
    1  0  0.3 
7  EDIBLE VEGETABLES AND CERTAIN ROOTS AND 
TUBERS. 
    3  8  1.3 
8  EDIBLE FRUIT AND NUTS; PEEL OR CITRUS FRUIT OR 
MELONS. 
     5  8  1.7 
9  COFFEE, TEA, MATE AND SPICES.       6  2  6.4 
10  CEREALS.      15  0  4.5 
12  OIL SEEDS AND OLEA. FRUITS; MISC. GRAINS, SEEDS 
AND FRUIT; INDUSTRIAL OR MEDICINAL PLANTS; 
STRAW AND FODDER. 
      3  1  1.8 
13  LAC; GUMS, RESINS AND OTHER VEGETABLE SAPS AND 
EXTRACTS. 
      2  1  10.2 
15  ANIMAL OR VEGETABLE FATS AND OILS AND THEIR 
CLEAVAGE PRODUCTS; PRE. EDIBLE FATS; ANIMAL OR 
VEGETABLE WAXEX. 
      2  36  0.8 
17  SUGARS AND SUGAR CONFECTIONERY.        2  2  1.9 
23  RESIDUES AND WASTE FROM THE FOOD INDUSTRIES; 
PREPARED ANIMAL FODER. 
      5  1  3.3 
24  TOBACCO AND MANUFACTURED TOBACCO 
SUBSTITUTES. 
      2  0  1.3 
40  RUBBER AND ARTICLES THEREOF.        6  8  1.0 
41  RAW HIDES AND SKINS (OTHER THAN FURSKINS) AND 
LEATHER 
      5  4  1.3 
44  WOOD AND ARTICLES OF WOOD; WOOD CHARCOAL.        1  10  0.1 
47  PULP OF WOOD OR OF OTHER FIBROUS CELLULOSIC 
MATERIAL; WASTE AND SCRAP OF PAPER OR 
PAPERBOARD. 
      0  6  0.0 
51  WOOL, FINE OR COARSE ANIMAL HAIR, HORSEHAIR 
YARN AND WOVEN FABRIC. 
      1  3  - 
52  COTTON.       20  6  7.8 




3.  Agreement on Agriculture (A-o-A) and India 
 
The success of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing  has given legitimate 
boosts and seriousness to multilateral trading system. Agreement on Textiles and 
Clothing, which promised to put an end to the country-by-country quotas on 
imports of textiles and clothing imposed by the major developed countries 
including the United States and European Union became a reality from January 
1, 2005.  On the other hand, the success of the Agreement on Agriculture in 
liberalizing agriculture was less than expected but it has opened the door to 
future liberalization and concrete results are expected in near future.  
3.1. Agreement on Agriculture (A-o-A) or URAA:  
The core objective of A -o-A is to establish a fair and market-oriented 
agricultural trading system. Its implementation period was six years for 
developed countries and nine for developing countries, starting with the date the 
agreement came into effect - January 1, 1995. These dates are now extended 
under a built-in provision of A -o-A of own review and renewal. That 
renegotiation is now underway, under the terms set a t the fourth WTO 
ministerial conference in Doha and the Framework Decision agreed at the WTO 
General Council on August 1, 2004. The AoA comprises three sections referred 
to as three pillars of the agreement:  
1.   Market access,  
2.   Domestic support and  
3.   Export subsidies.  
 
However at the outset, the agreement notes that the reform program should be 
made in an equitable way among all Members, having regard to non-trade 
concerns, including food security and the need to protect the environment; 
having regard to the agreement that special and differential treatment (SDT) for 
developing countries is an integral element of the negotiations, and taking into 
account the possible negative effects of the implementation of the reform 
program on least-developed and net food-importing developing countries. In 
addition, there are provisions of Special Products and Sensitive Products, which 
are to be exempted from stringent discipline of the above provisions of the A-o-  
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A.  Provision of Special Products designates a certain number of products of the 
developing countries that would be exempt from tariff reduction requirements 
and other disciplines in order to protect and promote food production, livelihood 
security and rural development. The key issues here are associated with the 
mechanism to decide on country-wise crops. In the case of developed countries 
also, certain products, based on political, social and cultural considerations are 
designated as Sensitive Products, which will be treated less stringently.  Here the 
main dispute lies between the United States, which has proposed 1 per cent of 
the tariff lines for such products while the EU is asking for 8 per cent of the 
tariff line. 
These above pillars require cuts in protections against imports or promotion of 
exports. These cuts are summarised in Table 6 and discussed briefly in the 
subsequent paragraphs.    
 
Table 6: Main provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture as derived from 
Uruguay Round 
Negotiated Reduction  Implementation period 





  Per cent  Per cent 
     
Market access     
Average tariff cut for al 
agriculture products 
-36  -24 
Minimum tariff cut per product  -15  -10 
Domestic Support     
Total cut in aggregate measure of 
support 
-20  -13 
Export subsidy     
Value cut  -36  -24 
Volume cut  -21  -14 
Note: Least developed countries were required to bind their tariffs but are 
otherwise exempted from reduction commitments.  
 
Source: WTO secretariat at www.wto.org  
 
Market Access:    
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The market access requires that tariffs fixed by individual countries be cut 
progressively to allow free trade. Since different countries fixed their tariffs at 
different levels confronting the interest of each other, several  harmonizing 
formula such as Uruguay Round formula, Swiss formula, Girard formula, and 
Canadian “income tax” formula were suggested to cut tariffs in which steeper 
cuts are suggested on higher tariffs, so as to bring all the international tariffs 
closer to almost the same level. All these formula have unique coefficients with 
different effects. The developed countries preferred Swiss mathematical Formula 
in which the coefficients also determine the maximum tariff where the starting 
tariffs will end up. For example, if the coefficient is 20, then a very high starting 
tariff will end up with a national tariff of exactly 20 percent and lower starting 
tariffs will end up proportionately lower, close to 20 percent as well. The 
developing countries do not like this formula because it quickly brings them 
closure to the competition, a situation they are not prepared. The key arguments 
is that the developed countries want to deprive developing countries a facility 
that has been extensively used by them to achieve current state of their economy. 
Other formulae are more flexible. For example the formula used in the Uruguay 
Round for agricultural tariff reductions required that tariffs be cut by a 
percentage average over a number of years; in that the developed countries 
agreed to cut tariffs by an average of 36 percent over six years with a minimum 
of 15 percent on each product; some cuts could be greater than others and thus 
the combination of average and minimum reductions allows countries the 
flexibility to vary their actual tariff reductions on individual products. 
Domestic support and the little boxes 
The A-o-A broadly  subdivides domestic support programs into three boxes with 
colours, green, blue and  amber and two other categories namely Development 
measures and  de minimis. Under current WTO rules, countries are free to 
employ subsidies under the "green" and "blue" boxes, certain  development 
measures, and the de minimis subsidies. In addition there are some Non-trade 
concerns (NTCs) listed in the preamble to the A-o-A, which can be used to 
legitimize government programs that run contrary to the market-oriented 
agricultural trading system. They include food security, rural development and   
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environmental protection. The European Union wants to include animal welfare 
and eco-labeling as NTCs. 
Subsidies in the G reen box (A-o-A Annex 2) have no or minimal distorting 
effect on production and hence trade. They include measures decoupled from 
output such as income-support payments (decoupled income support), safety-net 
programs, payments under environmental programs, and agricultural research-
and-development subsidies.  
The Blue box (A-o-A Article 6.5) contains direct payments under production-
limiting programs. They cover payments based on acreage, yield, or number of 
livestock in a base year. Because countries are allowed to revise the base year 
over time, subsidies in the blue box may have an effect on current output. Both 
the United States and the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy rely heavily on 
such programs.  
Development measures cover direct or indirect permitted (A-o-A article 6.2) 
assistance  aimed at encouraging agricultural and rural development in 
developing countries and is allowed. They include investment subsidies 
generally available to agriculture such as research and development, extension 
programs, and soil and water conservation; and  agricultural input subsidies 
available to low-income or resource-poor farmers such as fertilizer, water, and 
electricity. Under the de minimis provision, developed countries are allowed to 
use other subsidies with an aggregate value of up to 5 percent of the total value 
of domestic agricultural production in the case of developed countries and 10 per 
cent in the case of developing countries. 
The Amber Box (A-o-A Article 6) contains category of domestic support that is 
scheduled for reduction based on a formula called the “Aggregate Measure of 
Support” (AMS). The AMS calculates the amount of money spent by 
governments on agricultural production, except for those contained in the Blue 
Box, Green Box and de minimis. It required member countries to report their 
total AMS for the period between 1986 and 1988, bind it, and reduce it 
according to an agreed-upon schedule. Developed countries agreed to reduce 
these figures by 20% over six years starting in 1995. Developing countries   
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agreed to make 13% cuts over 10 years. Least-developed countries do not need 
to make any cuts. 
Export support 
 
Export support include trade distorting programs such as Export Subsidy, State 
Trading Enterprises2, Export Credits, Special and Differential Treatment, Special 
Products, and Sensitive Products aimed at benefiting the domestic producers 
against the international competition. A-o-A tends to eliminate or minimize such 
supports.  
Export subsidies are government payments to the exporting firms directed to 
encourage use of inputs from the domestic resources. Accordingly, an export 
subsidy program will pay the difference between a more expensive domestic 
input and a cheaper imported alternative in order to encourage exporters to buy 
inputs from domestic market. Dairy products and sugar in  EU continue to 
receive considerable export subsidies. The U.S. Step 2 program subsidizes its 
cotton production through U.S. exporting firms. 
Export credits given by a government to underwrite the cost of doing business 
on commercial terms also amounts to export subsidy. Often, the United States is 
criticized for such policies where the United States Government gives credit to 
its domestic companies to deliver goods in another country but the payments are 
recovered from the importing countries government in  long installments and 
cheaper interest rate making it more lucrative for the poor countries to import 
from the United States. This is also one of the major points of dispute between 
the United States and the EU and it is now agreed that such credit line will not 
exceed 180 days. 
 
3.2. Doha Round: brief of the package encompassing A-o-A 
 
The Fourth WTO Ministerial Conference was held in  Doha , Qatar from 9 to 14 
November 2001. In fact, the Doha Ministerial was a starting of a new round with 
unique feature focused on implementation of A-o-A and “Development” of the 
developing countries so that they could meaningfully become part of the 
                                                                   
2 Article XVII of the GATT 1994 deals with state trading enterprises and their operations    
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multilateral global trading system. The following Fifth WTO Ministerial 
Conference held in  Cancun, Mexico from 10 to 14 September 2003 was 
dedicated to stock taking of progress in negotiations and other work under the 
Doha Development Agenda (DDA). However, the DDA required correcting the 
imbalances that penalize developing countries and improve the commitment of 
WTO members. The modalities
3 for the Doha Round are to be completed by the 
end of April 2006, the draft schedule based on these modalities by 31 July 2006 
and the Round is expected to conclude by the end of 2006, a date chosen 
carefully for the Ministerial Meeting when the term of ‘Trade Promotion 
Authority of the United States’ ends. In this round the latest Ministerial was held 
in  Hong Kong Ministerial (Dec 13-18, 2005), which has given some hope for 
success as for the first time developing countries have managed to get a mention 
from developed countries of reduction in their subsidies otherwise most of the 
previous commitments have been falsified. The issues related to implementation 
of A-o-A dominate the Doha Round and they include:  
1.   High agriculture trade distorting subsidies granted by rich countries 
  
2.   Agriculture export subsidies  
 
3.   High tariffs on exports of agricultural and industrial products of interest 
to developing countries  
 
However, at various Ministerial negotiations new items from other agenda have 
been added  to make it a comprehensive round. For example, the modalities of 
the A-o-A are being coupled with GATS, and investment issues. Therefore, the 
proposals for negotiation have transformed to include among others the 
following (list of all items is provided in following sub-section):  
  
1.   On agriculture, 2013 as the end date for the elimination of export 
subsidies with an important part frontloaded by 2010 
 
2.   Agreement that the EU, US and Japan will undertake the biggest 
reductions on agricultural subsidies that distort trade and that these will 
be effective cuts, which is a serious improvement as compared to the 
previous round.  
 
                                                                   
3 Modalities describe the kind of commitments or targets (including numerical targets) that governments 
make in a trade agreement. The negotiations are all about modalities. They determine what is forbidden, 
what is allowed, how things should change and at what pace. Modalities are complemented by the 
schedules and together these complete an agreement.   
 
17 
3.   On cotton, which is of key importance to many African countries, export 
subsidies on cotton to be eliminated by 2006 and cuts to domestic 
subsidies will be greater and faster than for the rest of products.  
 
4.   Special agriculture products and a safeguard to protect those agricultural 
products of developing countries with concerns about livelihood 
security, food security and rural development  
 
5.   On industrial products, a Swiss formula to cut tariffs, with high tariffs 
subject to bigger cuts, thus addressing tariffs peaks and tariff escalation 
in particular on products of interest for developing countries. Developing 
countries will for a start cut tariffs only in proportion to the cuts by 
developed countries.   
 
6.   A step forward towards a completely duty-free and quota-free access for 
the world poorest country Members of the WTO  
 
7.   On Services, the door has been opened to plurilateral negotiations  
 
8.   Countries have started tabling collective requests in the services of 
sectors that are of particular interest to them 
 






3.3. India’s Ministerial Positions at Doha rounds and on A-o-A 
Pascal Lamy, WTO General Secretary visited India on April 5 2006 for the 
second time in last six months, which is an indicator of the gravity of problems 
being faced by Indians in meeting the demands of developed countries. The 
Indian position is that the development agenda and the farmers’ interest cannot 
be diluted and that the industrial and agriculture issues should not be mixed, 
while at the same time the Indian negotiators feel that no change is made in 
subsidy position of the developed  countries, yet new elements are being 
introduced. Nevertheless the Indian leadership has come up to the age of 
globalization and is slowly shedding its defensive posture and it has been 
demonstrating dynamism in the WTO n egotiations. 
India rejected the idea of introducing new issues such as Investment, 
Competition, Trade Facilitation or Transparency in Government Procurement, 
and did not consider the basic trade principles like non-discrimination or market   
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access appropriate for dealing with issues like Investment and Competition.  The 
Minister for Commerce and Industry raised the concerns that sensitive industries 
in developing countries including small-scale industries, which sustain a large 
labour force, could be destroyed.  India was firmly opposed to any linkage 
between trade and labour standards and recalled that the Singapore Declaration 
had once and for all dealt with this issue and there was no need to refer to it 
again. Similarly, on environment, India was strongly opposed to the use of 
environmental measures for protectionist purposes and to imposition of 
unilateral trade restrictive measures and considered that the existing WTO rules 
were adequate to deal with all legitimate environmental concerns. In fact the 
Minister termed them as Trojan horses of protectionism. 
Doha Ministerial was saved from failure to continue the work program. The 
African countries, deserted Indian hopes because they were promised the 
continuation of their trade preferences into the EU marke t for some more years. 
However, to the windfall pleasure of India, the round was launched with services 
brought into the fold of international rules through the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS). 
At the Cancun Ministerial (10-14 September 2003), India felt that the draft 
Cancún Ministerial Text was grossly inadequate on implementation issues, 
precision, operational and effectiveness and fixing responsibility and would 
severely affect the interests of developing countries in agriculture, industrial 
tariffs and Singapore issues. There was no progress in removing barriers to 
export from developing countries to the developed countries.  
India argued that all the time-lines set at Doha for their resolution have been 
breached. On certain issues even the mandate itself has been questioned. To 
make matters worse, the draft Ministerial text accords low priority to these 
issues. It does not envisage any time-frame for taking decisions for resolving 
outstanding issues. This is in sharp contrast to the issues of interest to developed 
countries for which time-lines have been provided for taking decisions.  
On agriculture subsidies, India argued that the prevailing subsidies in the 
developed countries were not targeted to keeping small struggling family farms   
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in business but to provide hefty rents to large farmers or corporates. On the other 
hand, against equity, justice and fair play, developing countries are being asked 
to liberalize their agriculture.  
India felt there was an urgent need to bring down the high tariffs and non-tariff 
barriers on products of export interest to developing countries while ensuring 
that special and differential treatment for developing countries and policy space 
to deal with sensitive products remain an integral part of all elements of 
negotiations. India reiterates that under no circumstances can it accept any form 
or harmonization of tariffs in agriculture or obligations to create and expand 
tariff rate quotas.  
On market access negotiations on non-agricultural products (NAMA), India 
favored the formula mandated by the Doha Declaration, without any amendment 
in any aspect of the formula.   
On investment, (one of the Singapore issues, others being, competition, 
transparency in government procurement, and trade facilitation) India felt that 
WTO was not the right forum, that the traditional WTO principles of non-
discrimination particularly national treatment are not appropriate for a 
development policy-related issue like investment and that trade negotiators are 
not the right people to deal with movements of capital that have dynamics of 
their own. It may be noted that China nor Brazil do not share this sentiment. 
There was failure to adopt Draft Ministerial Declaration and it was left for 
further work and resulting delays. India was more progressive as it offered to 
undertake modest liberalisation in industrial products and agreed to negotiate on 
two of the four so-called Singapore issues: transparency in government 
procurement and trade facilitation. Why did then the negotiations fail? 
Panagariya (2004) blames western Non Government Organizations (NGOs), 
their media campaign that the current trading system is unfair to the poor 
countries and also the role of the United States, which departed from Cairns 
group and joined EU, the later having too ambitious agenda on including 
investment and competition.   
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At the Hong Kong Ministerial (13 - 18 December 2005), on agriculture trade and 
subsidies and other non-tariff barriers, India quipped that its farmers are quite 
willing to deal with trade flows – but not with an avalanche of subsidy flows 
from developed countries. India argued that exporters from developing countries 
face incredible non-tariff barriers. These include the abuse of both anti-dumping 
measures and technical standards, often dealing with peripheral matters and 
extraneous considerations. India also insisted the need to finalize the proposal 
for duty-free and quota-free access for exports of least developed countries to 
developed country markets, without hedging. On development, India holds the 
view that no single 'harmonized' development strategy could be adopted. Each 
country must choose the path that best suits its own genius. Clearly, a room for 
negotiation has been created. 
3.4 Contentious issues and on-going Debate 
 
The main complaint about policies supporting domestic prices, subsidized 
production and subsidised exports is that they encourage over-production. This 
works as deterrent to imports and promotes low-priced dumping on world 
markets. However, there are also arguments in favour of subsidies, particularly 
in the case of net importers of agriculture products. Such countries do benefit 
from imports at suppressed prices, (see for example  (Panagariya, 2005). 
Nevertheless, depending on prolonged food aid program could render a country 
net importer of food due to the dependency created by circumstances and could 
discourage domestic production. Once such a vicious circle is created it becomes 
difficult to come out of it.    
Agriculture subsidies 
 
About 84 percent  of farmer households in India survive with less than 2.0 
hectare of land with average size of their holding being 0.63 hectare, while 
average size of all holdings in India is just about 1.4 hectare. Survival of such 
farmers is at stake if they do not get alternative means of livelihood. Where will 
these farmers get employment if Indian markets are flooded with foreign 
agricultural products under the market access program?    
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In India the product-specific support is negative, while the non-product specific 
support i.e., subsidies on agricultural inputs, such as, power, irrigation, fertilisers 
etc., is well below the permissible level of 10 per cent of the value of agricultural 
output. Therefore, India is under no obligation to reduce domestic support 
currently extended to the agricultural sector. Yet, subsidies are wisely considered 
burden in India and they are being rationalized. 
On the other hand, domestic subsidies in OECD countries during 2002 
accounted for about US$ 226.5 billion (Table 6), which has increased to 
US$279.5 billion in 2004.  
United States spent US$4 billion as subsidy to support its 25,000 cotton 
producers (US$160, 000 per producer) in 2003. 4  It is also argued that in 
countries such as United States, subsidies are enjoyed by a selected few, mostly 
producing corn, wheat, cotton, soybean, and rice, while growers of 400 other 
crops hardly get any such subsidy. Because of income and price support 
programs, the farmers in OECD countries are reported to use high levels of 
pesticides, fertilizers and herbicides in order to increase productivity of the land 
and maximize profits. But, these acts also lead to pollution of rivers and lakes. 
Therefore, in overall assessment, it is argued that the social benefits of subsidies 
may be much less and deserve to be curtailed  (Cooper 2004) and also see 
information uploaded at www.ewg.org/farm/). 
Table (6) compares 2002 values of subsidy for India and selected OECD 
countries. Subsidy constitutes almost 54 percent of the agriculture value added in 
OECD as compared to seven per cent in India. This figure will further go down 
when taken as percentage of value of agriculture output.  
Opposition to subsidy is also from within than outside. In the case of United 
States six reasons are promoted to kill farm subsidy: (1) Lower Food Prices for 
American Families, (2) Lower Costs and increased Exports for American 
Companies, (3) Budget Savings and Equity for the U.S. Tax Payers, (4) More 
Environment friendly Land Use, (5) Lager Market for U.S. Farmers and 
                                                                   
4 Oxfam, “Agriculture Dumping in Africa.” July 8, 2003.   
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Economic Diversification for Rural America, and (6) A more Hospitable World 
(Griswold, Slivinsy and Preble 2006). 
It is not that, the farmers in OECD countries will become jobless if subsidies are 
removed. The population dependency on farm is e xtremely thin in these 
countries. It is not like India, where more than 60 per cent of the population 
depends on farm. In OECD countries the farmers can easily switch to better 
options quickly as demonstrated in New Zealand, which was heavily subsidizing 
its sheep farmers until 1984. The sheep farm subsidy was completely removed 
within a span of one year after 1984 and today New Zealand is one of the least 
subsidized countries among OECD countries, with a subsidy incidence of just 
about 0.3 billion (3 per cent of total farm receipt as compared to 30 per cent in 
OECD)
5 in 2004. 
 
Table 6: Rural population condition and incidence of subsidy (2002) 















































India  754  140  768  7206  39605  10  53  7 
Canada  7  2340  3024  4798  6200  732  946  31 
USA  64  2340  2324  39105  38844  608  604  26 
Japan  27  1979  1701  44162  37968  1657  1424  84 
EMU  68  2050  2450  91407  109214  1337  1598  65 
OECD  188  2226  2334  226451  237431  1203  1262  54 
Source (basic data): OECD 2005 cited in GOI (2005): Agriculture Statistics 2005, WDI 2005 
 
How much agricultural production subsidy and agricultural export promotion 
subsidy may developed countries provide to their farmers without significant 
opposition from developing countries? 
Drawing on the game theoretical model of Gershenson and Grossman (2000), a 
simple model can be formulated to answer the above question. Let us assume 
                                                                   
5 Agriculture policies in OECD Countries: Monitoring and Evaluation 2005, OECD, Paris, 2005.   
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that there are two countries  – a developed country (DDC) and a developing 
country (DGC)  – struggling to succeed with their agricultural trade policy 
options. The DDC will always try to be stern on its trade policy options, 
particularly the agricultural subsidies and agricultural export promotion 
measures, while the DGC will seek to eliminate DDC’s agricultural subsidies, its 
agricultural trade restrictions on DGC’s agricultural exports, and also to protect 
its industrial and agricultural sectors arising as a consequence of the restrictive 
agricultural trade policy of the DDC. We assume that both DDC and DGC 
maximize expected benefits they seek by engaging in A -o-A negotiations in 
WTO to achieve their respective trade policy options. Let B1 denote the 
expected payoff for the DDC should it succeed in convincing the DGC to accept 
its trade policy options of agricultural subsidies and agricultural export 
promotion measures. In quantitative terms, this is equal to the product of its 
probability that the DDC succeeds in retaining its agricultural subsidies and 
exports promotion measures (T1), and the value in socio-economic terms that 
DDC attaches to retaining its existing subsidy policy (V1), minus the amount 
that the DDC spends on subsidies and export promotion measures (S1). It 
chooses S1 to maximize T1, where 
B1 = [(T1)(V1)] – S1.           (1) 








 > 0. S1 is the nonnegative amount that the DDC spends on 
agricultural subsidies and export promotion measures. 
The expected payoff for the DGC is denoted as B2. It is equal to the product of 
the probability (1-T1) that the DGC gains towards DDC’s abolition of 
agricultural subsidies and opening up the DDC for the agricultural trade of DGC 
and the value in socio-economic terms that the DGC attaches to gaining from the 
removal of the DDC’s subsidies to its agricultural sector and from access for its 
agricultural trade into the DDC (V2), minus the amount, S2 that the DGC spends 
on protecting its industry and agriculture sectors in a way challenging the 
existing trade policy option of the DDC. The DGC chooses S2 to maximize B2 
in a such way that    
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<0. S2 is the nonnegative amount that the DGC spends on 
protecting its agriculture and industry sectors. 
This analysis further assumes that the initial resources available to both DDC 
and DGC are su fficient to finance the implied amounts of spending S1 and S2. 
In order to focus on the implications of differences in the values that both DDC 
and DGC attach to their agricultural trade policies, the following two 
assumptions are made: (i) V1 is not necessarily equal to V2 because, the DDC 
may have a better alternative than the DCG in case that it is not possible to 
continue its agricultural trade policy of subsidies and export promotion 
measures; and (ii) V1 and V2 are given. To determine the probability that the 
DDC succeeds in retaining its subsidy policy, it is assumed that T1 depends on 









=                 (3) 
If the DGC agrees to the trade policy option of the DDC, then S2 equals zero. In 
equation (3), the nonnegative parameter  l  measures the effectiveness of 
lobbying for the removal of subsidies by the DGC relative to the lobbying of 
retaining the subsidies given by the DDC. In equation (3), T1 is an increasing 
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How should S1 be chosen by DDC in order to receive support from the DGC for 
its agricultural trade policy? In order to maximise its expected payoff, B1, the 
DDC chooses S1 to satisfy the first order condition, 
                                                                   
6 A ‘contest success function is a mathematical relation whose inputs are the amounts of resources devoted 
to conflict by each one of the contestants and whose output is the division of the contested prize between   
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    (5) 
 
With the assumptions that S2 is equal to zero and B1 is a decreasing linear 
function of S1, equations (1) and (3) imply either that B1 has an interior 









 with  2 1 0 V S l < <               (6) 









 for all  2 1 V S l <               (7) 
 
Equation (6) indicates that if the DDC chooses subsidies and export promotion 
measures, S1 less than  ltimes the value that the DGC attaches to gaining in 
socio-economic terms from the removal of subsidies and export p romotion 
measures (V2) of DDC, then S1 is such that there will be zero marginal increase 
in benefit due to the marginal increase in S1. The marginal benefit of S1 
includes both a direct effect of S1 on T1 and an indirect effect of S1 on T1 via 
the effect of S1 on S2. 
On the other hand, equation (7) states that if the DDC chooses S1 equal to  2 V l , 
then for all values of S1 less than  2 V l , the marginal benefit of S1 exceeds the 
marginal cost. Therefore, the DDC would be interested in situations in which S1 
‡  2 V l . 
Now, substituting values for the terms on R.H.S. in equation (5), conditions 
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them, or the average expected likelihood of success for each one of the contestants. For a comprehensive 
analysis, see Hirshleifer (2001). 






















































































 is less than  l 2  implies that the DGC spends a 
positive amount on protection of its sectors in response to the level of subsidies 






smaller than  l 2 , the existing subsidy policy results not in conflict with the 









   is the amount that the DDC chooses to 
spend on agricultural subsidies and export promotion measures, which is less 
than  2 V l  and an insufficient amount to create a potential conflict with the 
DGC. 





 is as large as or larger than 
l 2 , this means that the amount of agricultural subsidies and export promotion 
measures spent by the DDC is sufficient to trigger strong  opposition for its 
agricultural policy from the DGC. Though it may be difficult to measure 
accurately, V1, V2, and  l , which is also beyond the scope of this paper, data 





 might be as large as or 
larger than  l 2 . That could be the reason that in the Doha Round of Hong Kong 
Ministerial (Dec 13-18, 2005), for the first time developing countries have 
managed to get a mention of reduction in subsidies by developed countries.
                     
4. India’s Readiness: Agriculture Policy Regime  
As a general policy of trade reforms in India, some 1,400 quantitative 
restrictions including those on agriculture products were replaced by the custom 
tariffs.  While tariff rates have been declining and aimed to achieve the level of 
ASEAN countries, the average MFN tariff7 is still over 20 per cent. However, 
almost all the tariff lines in the case of agriculture are bound
8. The average 
                                                                   
7 The MFN tariff is based on “standard” rates of duty, which are statutory tariffs and may only be changed 
through legislation. 
8 Binding plays an important role in signaling to the business community an upper limit for possible tariff 
increases. As a result of the Uruguay Round negotiations, India had bound about 67 per cent of its tariff 
lines, while applied tariff were kept below bound rates. Subsequently, India submitted rectification and 
modifications of its schedule under Article XXVIII: 1 of the GATT, 1994 and increased the number of 
bound tariffs from 67%, to 72.4% in 2001. Bindings have been undertaken for previously unbound 
products, such as textiles and clothing, while India renegotiated some commitments on previously bound   
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applied tariff on agriculture products in 2004 was about 49 per cent while the 
average bound rate was 125 per cent. In addition, anti-dumping measures have 
become an important element in India's trade policy.  
With the removal of QRs on Indiaís imports, apprehensions have been expressed 
that such removal may impact the domestic producers adversely and result in a 
surge and dumping of imports into the country. However, necessary mechanisms 
have been put in place to provide adequate protection and a level playing field to 
domestic players vis-à-vis imports. Appropriate tariffication, at peak customs 
duty, have been effected for these QRs. A number of agricultural and 
horticultural products placed on the free list of imports in earlier years have also 
been brought to the peak rate to ensure adequate protection to Indian farmers. 
Tariff binding for such products have also been renegotiated at substantially 
higher levels. For sensitive agricultural products, suitable enabling provision has 
been made to fix the statutory tariff rates at appropriate high levels. It has also 
been decided to amend the 1992 Foreign Trade (Development & Regulation) 
Act for vesting the Government with necessary powers to impose QRs as a 
temporary safeguard measure. EXIM Policy announced on 31.3.2001 further 
provides for the following measures to protect the domestic producers: 
•  Import of agricultural products like wheat, rice, maize, other coarse cereals, 
copra and coconut oil has been placed in the category of State Trading. The 
nominated State Trading Enterprise will  conduct the imports of these 
commodities solely as per commercial considerations. Similarly, import of 
petroleum products including petrol, diesel and ATF has also been placed in 
the category of State Trading. Import of urea will also be done through the 
mechanism of State Trading. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
items, relating mainly to agriculture. India bound 100% of all agricultural lines (under the WTO definition 
of agriculture) and 68.2% of lines for non-agricultural products. Bindings were not made in several chapters 
including fish and crustacean products (HS 3) in agriculture; and leather products (HS 42), footwear (HS 
64), headgear (HS 65), and base metals (HS 83) in manufacturing (Chart III.1). In general, India bound its 
tariff at ceiling rates ranging from 40% for non-agricultural products to 100% for most agricultural products 
and 300% for edible oils. As a result of India's commitments, the final average bound tariff is expected to 
be 50.6% in 2005, with an average of 115.7% in agriculture (HS 1-24) and 37.7% in non-agricultural 
products (Table III. 1)14. These averages do not include lines where different parts of the HS six-digit line 
were bound at different rates (WTO 2002).The rectification and modifications of India's Schedule have 
resulted in an increase in a number of tariffs; however, they are not yet certified because of reservations 
raised. India has nevertheless, pursuant to Article XXVIII(3) of the GATT 1947, applied these higher rates. 
As a result, although most final bound tariffs are considerably higher than their corresponding current MFN 
rates, MFN rates on a few tariff lines appear to be higher than the final bound rate. The products concerned 
include milk and cream products, wheat and muslin, alcoholic products, and some fabrics (WTO 2002)   
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•  Imports have also been made subject to various existing domestic regulations 
like Food Adulteration Act and Rules there under, Meat Food Product Order, 
Tea Waste (Control Order) and import of textile material using the 
prohibited dyes has been banned. 
•  To ensure that import of agricultural products do not lead to unwanted 
infiltration of exotic diseases and pests in the country, it has been decided to 
subject imports of all primary products of plant and animal origin to ëBio 
Security & Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary Permití. Import of foreign liquor, 
processed food products and tea wastes have been subjected to already 
existing domestic regulations concerning health and hygiene. 
Export promotion  
To boost exports of farm goods, quantitative restrictions on exports of 
agricultural items like wheat, wheat products, coarse grains, butter and non-
basmati rice and packaging restrictions on exports of pulses were removed in 
February 2002. Export restrictions were removed on groundnut oil, agricultural 
seeds, wheat and wheat products, butter, rice and pulses from April 2002. Exim 
policy 2002-07 has further liberalized the agriculture exports. Nevertheless, 
agriculture sector requires further reforms to improve its productive efficiency 
(Kalirajan, Mythili, and Sankar, 2001). 
India’s population dependency on agriculture is extremely high (Table 7), which 
makes agriculture all the more critical for the welfare of its people. However, 
despite so much of efforts, the productivity in terms of yields  is still lagging 
seriously and there is large scope for improvement (Table 8). If India could 
improve its farm productivity, it can become a leading exporter of agriculture 
products.  
Table 7: Employment in agriculture (% of total employment) 
  1971-80181-901991-002001-03
China  68.7  58.2  49.4   
India    69.1  67.1   
European Monetary Union  13.7  12.6  5.4  4.5 
High income  9.0  7.7  4.6  4.0 
Latin America & Caribbean    19.3  18.4  17.4 
Low income    66.8  62.9   
Middle income  61.5  49.6  40.1   
World    43.3  39.9     
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Table 8: Indicators of agriculture related developments 
  1961-70 1971-80181-90 1991-00 2001-03 
Cereal yield (kg per hectare)            
China  1733  2532  3822  4672  4856 
India  977  1220  1622  2153  2337 
European Monetary Union  2436  3293  4171  5127  5307 
High income  2848  3254  3806  4534  4749 
Latin America & Caribbean  1375  1641  2064  2586  3020 
Low income  1046  1256  1575  1867  2025 
Middle income  1415  1898  2459  2924  3193 
Sub-Saharan Africa  826  977  1052  1050  1071 
World  1574  2019  2502  2907  3100 
Food production index (1999-2001 = 100)          
China  22.6  30.7  47.4  80.2  108.5 
India  34.9  44.8  63.4  87.5  101.3 
European Monetary Union        95.9  97.9 
High income        94.5  98.4 
Latin America & Caribbean      72.3  86.7  106.6 
Low income      65.9  87.2  103.1 
Middle income      67.9  88.3  106.5 
Sub-Saharan Africa      67.0  88.3  103.2 
World        89.9  103.4 
Source (basic data): World Development Indicators 2005, the World Bank 
 
 
Selected Import Policies 
 
Table 9 shows India’s import policies for selected agriculture products. It is 
argued that some of the import policies have contributed to reduction in 
productive efficiency of certain crops at the farm level. For example, trade 
policy reforms in the mid-1990s have increased market access, and domestic 
price support policies have generally favored production of crops that compete 
with oilseeds, resulting in waning oil crop production and stagnant yields. 
Efficiency gains in the oilseed processing sector have also been hampered by 
poor infrastructure and policies restricting the scale of processing plants  (Erik 
Dohlman, Persaud and Landes, 2003). 
 
Table 9: Import Policy of selected Agricultural Commodities 
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Commodity  Bound duty 











Key Aspects of Import Policy 
Rice  80  Up to 80  80  •  Canalized through Food Corporation of 
India (FCI)      
•  *Rice with 50% or more broken is 
allowed freely. 
Wheat  100  50  50  •  Import is canalized FCI 
•  Import by Roller Flour Mills (RFMs) was 
also allowed freely till recently. 
•  STC/ MMTC/PEC are permitted to 
import wheat on behalf of RFMs. 
Maize  70  50  50  •  Import is canalized through FCI and 
PEC Ltd. 
•  Import of maize for manufactures of 
poultry and animal feed is permitted 
freely on actual user condition subject to 
registration of import contract/ letter of 
credit with NAFED. 
•  Import of maize for supply to poultry and 
animal feed manufactures and for starch 
industry up to 50,000 MT each by 
NAFED has been permitted. 
Sorghum  80  50  80  •  Import is canalized through FCI and 
PEC Ltd. 
Barley  100  50  Free  •  Import is canalized through FCI and 
PEC Ltd. 
 
Jowar  70  50  70  Import is canalized through FCI and PEC Ltd. 
Oilseeds (except Copra)  100  35  30  •   Import is allowed freely. 
Rapeseed oil  75  35  75  •   Import is allowed freely. 
Sunflower oil  300  35  85  •   Import is allowed freely. 
Crude palm oil (edible 
grade) 
300  75  80  •   Import is allowed freely. 
Soybean oil  45  38.5  45  •   Import is allowed freely. 
Pulses  100  5  10  •   Import is allowed freely. 
Sugar  150  60  60+CVD  •   Import is allowed freely 
Vegetables (except 
onion) 
100  15  30  •   Import is allowed freely. 
Onion  100  0  5  •   Import is allowed freely. 
Fruits         
(a) Dates   100  35  30  •   Import is allowed freely. 
(b) Fresh Grapes  100  25  25   
(c) Apples  50  50  50   
         
Source: Agriculture statistics, Government of India (Various) 
 
The import policy of the government with respect to sugar, which is one of the 
internationally discussed product, and products like that are heavily influenced 
by  the domestic treatment of the product. In the case of sugar, as stated earlier, 
the domestic producers are subjected to dual control. Part of the product is 
subjected to price control while the price of key input the sugarcane is fixed by 
the state governments in each of the 19 sugar producing regions of the country. 
Clearly, in such a situation the domestic producers cannot be subjected to third 
agony of matching the international price in the domestic market. Accordingly, 
heavy duties are imposed on the i mported sugar although the import itself is 
under OGL with contracts registered with APEDA. The rate of duty again varies   
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according to the prevailing market prices because government cannot afford high 
fluctuation in the market price of sugar. As such, sugar is subjected to 
countervailing duty of Indian Rs. 850 (approximately, US$18) per tonne while 
customs rates have varied between zero and 100 per cent during 19990s. 
Cotton is another internationally strategic commodity, particularly in the United 
States. For the export of cotton, the Government allocates quotas of raw cotton 
with the bulk going to state agencies like CCI and MCGF, and the rest going to 
state level marketing federations and private traders. Many a time, the state 
agencies contract out these quotas to private traders for a commission  (Bathla 
2006). Import of cotton was allowed for exporting units directly after 1994. 
Also, import of raw cotton was made free till 1999 (with no import duty) to 
ensure easy availability of cotton at competitive prices for the Indian textile 
industry. From March 1999, a duty of 5 per cent plus a surcharge of 1 0 per cent 
has been imposed.  
5. Conclusions 
Though India has demonstrated that there exists broad political support to its 
economic reform programme, as has been proved by the transition of several 
Governments in the last decade through the political space, agricultural trade 
policy reforms need to be accelerated much more than what has been done so 
far. The challenge is to mitigate the inefficiency that exists in the Indian 
agriculture to close the gap between its potential and actual performances 
through a proper policy framework.  
India being a net exporter in agriculture products, it has more to gain from the 
trade reforms. It has sufficiently high bound rates on most of the products and 
therefore, flexibility can be ensured against unfair competition. India does not 
have to worry about its subsidy, as it is already below the required line and it 
also does not have any domestic support to recon with. All these place India in 
an advantageous position. Moreover, the ongoing negotiations are likely to yield 
enough flexibility in product choice and tariff selection. A multilateral trading 
system is in the interest of India, given the fact that  it is placed in such a 
situation where no clear group fits well. Therefore, India should work towards   
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the success of the Doha round and in the mean time make use of the opportunity 
to reform its domestic market to bring in more efficiency. 
The interests of  India are certainly at variance from the common interest of least 
developed countries, which became amply clear during the Tokyo and Doha 
Ministerials, when the least developed countries left India alone. Many of these 
countries are net importers of food and the subsidy in the exporting countries 
makes them better off. Moreover, under the Everything But Arms (EBA) 
initiative of the European Union, the LDCs have quota- and duty-free access to 
the EU market
9, a facility that was never available to India. The services sector 
for India is critical to its growth and increasing the pace of industrial growth is 
its necessity. With favourable bound rates for agriculture onboard, the 
negotiating framework of India must be different from that of other developing 
countries. The situation is highly tenacious for India, particularly in view of the 
fact that the developed countries have managed to link agriculture subsidy with 
the market access in services and industry. If the European Union needs to do 
more on agricultural tariffs, and the US needs to do more on reducing 
agricultural subsidies, then the G -20 group of countries, where India is a key 
member, are also needed to do more on industrial tariffs. This is a hard ball 
game. Moreover, all these issues are dynamically linked to the future agenda of 
the WTO inter-alia in terms of substantial opening up trade in services; rules 
governing transparency in bilateral trade agreements, anti-dumping and 
subsidies; trade facilitation; trade & environment; WTO agreement on 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and its relation with Convention on Bio-
Diversity (CBD), and extensions to geographical indication protection (GIs); 
Dispute Settlement and Aid for Trade. 
Traditionally, India has fallen prey to the group dynamics because its interests 
do not fully confirm to the least developed countries, whose cause it used to 
champion nor does it radically differ from those of developed countries, who it 
confronts. Therefore, the time has come for India to come out of ambiguity and 
take a rational step in the negotiation process to harness best of its own interests. 
Some sacrifices are worth taking in order to gain a wider market. 
                                                                   
9 Currently, there are three exceptions: bananas, rice and sugar where quotas exist. But the quotas are slated 
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